



The End of Austerity in Europe?
blogs.lse.ac.uk /eurocrisispress/2015/01/28/the-end-of-austerity-in-europe/
By Max Hänska
After a spectacular swing to the left, away from a political establishment that ruled the country uninterrupted for
decades, Greece’s election signals the changed mood that is taking hold of Europe. Austerity has failed. What
economists have been saying all along, has now been loudly affirmed by the electorate.
I take it as a given that Greek debt is unsustainable in the long run, and that austerity measures have precipitated a
spiral of economic contractions that have aggravated economic woes—this much, at least, should be
uncontroversial. But identifying the problem is the easy part. Finding a workable solution is the hard problem. In
finding a solution Europe faces an economic and a political challenge.
The economic arithmetic
Greece rightly wants to get a reprieve from cuts that have battered the country for close to half a decade. The
question is how to fund additional spending?
Greece is running a small primary surplus  (before servicing debt), so in
theory it could decide to default on its loans (though the government
has declared it will not default), strengthen its tax base by fighting tax evasion and direct additional revenue towards
spending, instead of servicing debt.
However, reneging on its obligations would probably also force the ECB to retract its liquidity line to Greek banks—
which have been drawing heavily on the ECB to remain liquid as capital flight has remained high. Disrupt this
liquidity line, and Greece will have a banking crisis on its hand. To raise the money to shore up its banks without
external funds (it is not clear that this would even be possible), it would have to cut public spending even further than
it has already done, in turn suffocating the economy and reducing its tax base. A banking crisis would probably
precipitate more cash-in-hand transactions further decreasing declared income, and thus tax revenue.
Greece could exit the Euro (though the government has also declared it will not do so, and how an exit would work is
anyone’s guess). But, hypothetically, how much confidence would a new drachma enjoy? Presumably wherever
possible Euros would be used in cash transactions , no matter what new currency the government decides to
institute, reproducing the problem of a shrinking tax base. Either way, the state would soon find itself short of the
necessary cash to pay wages, pensions, etc.
How could a negotiated debt-restructuring—a write-off, extended maturity, or interest rate reduction—look like?
Roughly 16% of Greek debt is held by the IMF and ECB, the former has always insisted on full repayment. If Greece
manages to get concessions beyond extended maturities from the IMF (i.e. a write-off) this would be unprecedented.
The ECB cannot accept a write-off because it would be in outright breach of its mandate (monetary financing of
states). If it did this would cause a constitutional crisis of the euro system. In any case, the ECB has played its last
card. Interest rates are effectively at 0%, and it is now soaking up government debt to the tune of around 3000 euros
per Eurozone citizen to counter deflation. Unfortunately, as is the case in a borderless world, most this additional
liquidity will flow towards the strongest economies, instead of generating demand in the weakest ones.
60% of Greek debt are EU loans guaranteed by Eurozone member states. A reduction of debt would activate these
guarantees and effectively require other members to repay Greek debt. With 56bn Germany is the larger guarantor,
followed by France, Italy and Spain. Would all guarantors take a proportional hit? What about Portugal, which has
a lower minimum wage than Greece? And how would the activation of these guarantees affect the budgets of Italy,
for instance? Given these challenges, an outright write-off seems improbable, extended maturities and more
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favourable conditions more likely.
The remainder of Greek debt is held by private creditors, but these are surely hold-outs who will insist on full
repayment at some point down the line, as they did with Argentinian debt.
Furthermore, if we are talking about an end of Austerity (and thus extra cash for public spending) across Europe, the
arithmetic changes. We would no longer be talking about guarantees, but debt-mutualisation, or Eurobonds.
The political challenge
This leads us to a set of political problems that some commentators prefer to overlook.
To be sustainable, and realistic, mutual debt, sufficient for a significant stimulus, would require a political vehicle, a
European fiscal authority with some real capacities to effectively coordinate European economies. Such a capacity
would need to include the ability to raise (at least some) taxes to fund itself independently. This would require the
ability to create its own tax raising institutions where existing ones are inefficient. Without some bona fide capacities
it is hard to see how Eurobonds would allow Europe to borrow at reasonable conditions (i.e. at rates much closer to
current German than Greek borrowing costs). Such a political vehicle would also have to negotiate the best way to
spend common funds to stimulate growth.
Without such a capacity Eurobonds would effectively allow Greece and Italy to vote that Germany should give them
money, without Germany having any influence on how it is spent. The moral hazard created by such arrangements
would hardly be conducive to wise fiscal policy.
The fears that debt-mutualisation without some coordinating capacity would remove any incentive to reform, are
real. Syriza has already suggested that it will reverse the dismissal of civil servants. But unless it starts re-hiring on
the basis of need (e.g. to strengthen the capacity and efficiency of greek tax authorities) and individual merit, instead
of simply reinstating their supporters, thus continuing clientelistic practices that caused Greece’s political morass,
there will be no confidence that any additional public spending will be used to pursue meaningful reforms.
It is clear that austerity must end. The real problem for the Eurozone is finding a political vehicle to raise funds for,
and effectively implement a stimulus.
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of the Euro Crisis in the Press blog, nor of the
London School of Economics.
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